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Immigration is today one of the most hotly debated policy issues in the United States. 
Despite marked divergence of opinion even within political parties, several important reforms 
have  been  introduced  in  the  post  1965  era.  The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  carry  out  a 
systematic analysis of the drivers of the voting behavior of US representatives on immigration 
policy in the period 1970-2006, and in particular to assess the role of economic factors at the 
district  level.  Our  findings  suggest  that  representatives  from  more  skilled  labor  abundant 
districts are more likely to support an open immigration policy towards the unskilled, whereas 
the opposite is true for representatives from more unskilled labor abundant districts. This 
evidence is robust to the introduction of an array of additional economic and non-economic 
characteristics of the districts, and suggests that a simple factor analysis model can go a long 
way in explaining the voting behavior on immigration policy.  
JEL Classification: F22, J61 
Keywords: Immigration policy, Voting, Political Economy 
 
* Erasmus University Rotterdam, Università di Milano, Centro Studi Luca D’Agliano (LdA), 
CEPR  and  CES-Ifo.  E-Mail:  facchini@ese.eur.nl.**  Hamburg  Institute  of  International 
Economics (HWWI), LdA and ECARES. E-Mail: steinhardt@hwwi.org. We would like to 
thank seminar participants at the Second Conference on the Transnationality of Migrants in 
Louvain  La  Neuve,  the  Hamburg  Institute  of  International  Economics,  the  14th  Spring 
Meeting of Young Economists in Istanbul, the 3rd INSIDE Workshop in Barcelona, the 9th 
Conference  of  the  Society  for  the  Advancement  of  Economic  Theory  in  Ischia  and  the 
international APPAM conference in Maastricht for useful comments and suggestions. This 
paper has been written while Steinhardt was an early stage researcher within the Marie Curie 
Research  Training  Network  on  “Transnationality  of  Migrants  (TOM)”  funded  by  the 
European  Commission  under  the  6
th  Framework  Programme.  Giovanni  Facchini 
acknowledges financial support from the Fondazione CRT - Progetto Alfieri in the framework 
of the Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano research project on “Migration and Mobility of Tasks: the 
Internationalisation of the Firm”.    2 
Introduction 
 
Immigration and immigration policy have been among the most hotly debated policy issues in 
the United States ever since independence (Hatton and Williamson 2005), and recent evidence 
suggests that views on immigration continue to differ greatly among the public (Scheve and 
Slaughter  2001,  Hanson,  Scheve  and  Slaughter  2007,  Mayda  2006).  Interestingly,  vastly 
heterogeneous opinions can be found also within - supposedly more homogeneous - political 
parties. For instance, in reporting on the debate spurred by the immigration policy reform 
proposal introduced in 2005, many commentators have highlighted the divisiveness of the 
issue. Watanabe and Becerra (2006) suggest that “The Republican Party is split among those 
who want tougher restrictions, those who fear alienating the Latino vote and business owners 
who are pressing for more laborers to fill blue collar jobs in construction, cleaning, gardening 
and  other  industries.”  At  the  same  time,  whereas  in  the  recent  past  the  platform  of  the 
Democratic Party has been pro-immigration, many Democratic constituencies have shown 
concerns  with  the  increased  inflows  of  foreigners.  In  particular,  US  labor  unions  have 
traditionally opposed growing inflows of foreign workers
1 - and much of their rank and files 
continue to do so - even if they now officially welcome Latinos and other immigrants. 
Notwithstanding the very controversial nature of the debate, the post 1965 era has seen the 
introduction of a series of important immigration policy measures. The purpose of this paper 
is to provide a systematic analysis of the factors that have shaped the voting behavior of US 
House Representatives on new legislation on unskilled immigration introduced between 1970 
and 2006.  
In carrying out our analysis, we focus on the role played by the economic drivers of the voting 
decision and, in particular, by the labor market characteristics of a constituency. To frame our 
question, we start by developing a simple theoretical model in which heterogeneous districts 
differ in their relative endowment of skilled and unskilled labor. By changing factor supplies, 
immigration affects factor income, thus creating winners and losers.
2 An elected politician 
chooses to support or not an immigration policy initiative  depending on whether or not it 
increases  the  constituency’s  weighted  average  welfare.  The  model  suggests  that  –  ceteris 
                                                 
1 See Watts (2002). 
2 See Berry and Soligo (1969). Empirical evidence on the effect of immigration on wages is more co ntroversial. 
In particular, Borjas (2003, 2006) finds robust evidence on the adverse effect of immigration on natives workers’ 
wages, whereas Card (2009), Ottaviano and Peri (2008) among others, find a much smaller  – and often not 
significant effect.     3 
paribus – an elected representative is more likely to favor an open policy towards unskilled 
immigrants the more skilled labor abundant his district is.  
We assess the predictions of our stylized model using a novel dataset we have constructed. 
Our data cover all individual recorded votes on immigration policy measures affecting the 
supply  of  unskilled  immigrants,  which  have  been  introduced  in  the  US  House  of 
Representatives  over  the  period  1970-2006.  Individual  level  voting  decisions  are  then 
complemented with a wealth of district level characteristics, covering both economic and non-
economic drivers of individual voting decisions.  
Our empirical analysis suggests that labor market characteristics – as captured by district level 
factor endowments - are statistically significant drivers of a representative’s voting behavior 
on immigration policy. In particular, we find that representatives from more skilled labor 
abundant  districts  are  more  likely  to  support  an  open  immigration  policy  towards  the 
unskilled, while representatives from more unskilled labor abundant districts are less likely to 
do so. Quantitatively, the effects we find are important: an increase by one percentage point in 
the  share  of  skilled  workers  in  a  district  leads  to  approximately  a  one  percentage  point 
increase  in  the  probability  that  the  district  representative  will  support  a  bill  liberalizing 
unskilled immigration. 
Besides the labor market characteristics of the district, the literature has suggested that other 
factors may affect voting behavior. Thus, to assess the robustness of our findings, we explore 
the role played by additional economic characteristics, by political/ideological drivers, and by 
ethnic features of the district. While several of these channels do play a role in shaping voting 
behavior on immigration, our main results are unaffected. The expected labor market impact 
of immigration is a robust driver of decision making on immigration policy matters. 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the most comprehensive attempt to date to 
systematically investigate the role of economic and non-economic drivers on immigration 
policy  voting  behavior  in  the  post  1965  era.  It  is  also  the  only  one  that  directly  exploit 
differences  in  factor  endowments  across  districts  to  capture  the  extent  of  expected  labor 
market competition brought about by new, unskilled, immigration.  
The congressional politics of immigration policy has been the subject of an extensive array of 
previous  studies.  Gimpel  and  Edwards  (1999),  in  their  very  comprehensive  work  on 
immigration policy making, analyze a variety of individual bills, but pay little or no attention   4 
at all towards district level economic determinants. Goldin’s (1994) study of the introduction 
of the literacy test provision is instead one of the pioneering contributions in the economics 
literature. Several other papers in this tradition have focused on single or a narrow set of 
legislative initiatives. For instance, Gonzalez and Kamdar (2000) have analyzed the 1996 
Immigration  Reform  and  Immigrant  Responsibility  Act  (H.R.  2202)  and  have  found  that 
representative of district characterized by a higher share of workers employed in low-skill 
intensive industries tended to be more in  favor of immigration restrictions. Fetzer (2006) 
found a similar result in his analysis of the voting on H.R. 4437 during the 109
th Congress, but 
looking at the distribution of individuals across occupations in a given district.
3 Bananian, 
Bodvarsson and Lowenberg (2006) - following a similar approach - have considered instead 
four important bills introduced between 1980 and 1996, and have focused on the role played 
by sectoral employment in shaping voting behavior. Besides covering a larger sample of 
votes, our analysis has  the advantage of focusing on a direct measure of the educational 
achievement at the district level, which is less likely to react in the short run to changes in 
immigration policy at the national level. 
An interesting, recent study by Milner and Tingley (2009) is the contribution in the literature 
that comes closest to ours in scope. The authors analyze a large panel of votes on immigration 
policy related issues which took place in the US Congress between 1979 and 2003, and 
explore the role of both economic  and non-economic drivers of individual representatives’ 
choices. Importantly, their analysis differ from ours in several key dimensions, involving both 
the data used and the methodology followed to carry out the study. First of all, our sample 
covers a longer time period. Secondly, Milner and Tingley (2009) include in their analysis all 
votes on migration – both on final passage bills and on intermediate legislative steps
4 - and 
also votes on immigration bills that are not expected to directly affect the l abor supply in the 
United States. Our focus is instead narrower, as on the one hand we consider only those bills, 
which - as the literature has argued – directly impact the domestic labor supply. Furthermore, 
we focus exclusively on final passage bills, as expectations on the effects at the district level 
of floor amendments are less clear than for final passage votes. Third, Milner and Tingley use 
the share of individuals working in highly skilled jobs
5 as the key proxy for the district’s labor 
market characteristics, whereas we use a more fundamental measure, which is based directly 
                                                 
3 He finds that support for the bill overwhelmingly came from representatives of districts characterized by a high 
share of blue collar employment.  
4 Typically, this involves floor amendments etc. 
5 This is defined as the percentage of working age persons in  a district employed in executive, managerial, 
administrative and professional occupation.   5 
on  educational  attainment  at  the  district  level.  Interestingly  –  and  differently  from  our 
analysis, they find only limited support for the role played by the labor market channel in 
shaping voting behavior.  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the recent developments 
in the congressional history of US immigration policy. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical 
model, which drives our empirical investigation. Section 4 describes our data, while section 5 
presents our empirical results. In section 6 we carry out a series of robustness checks, and 
section 7 concludes the paper. 
1. A short overview of recent US Migration Policy 
The votes included in our sample span over the years 1970-2006, a period during which the 
United States has seen immigration levels soaring and immigration policy becoming once 
again the focus of much debate. In this section we provide a brief overview of the main policy 
initiatives which have been introduced in this period, and highlight their impact on unskilled 
immigration. For a summary of the bills introduced in this period, see Table 1. 
1.1 1970-1980 
The US migration policy in the seventies was characterized by the introduction of a series of 
amendments  to  the  Immigration  and  Nationality  Act  of  1965,  which  had  abolished  the 
national-origin quota system and replaced it with a system emphasizing the importance of 
family ties and as a result had greatly simplified the family reunification process.  
Parallel  with  this  shift  in  the  immigrants  channel  of  entry,  economic  conditions  changed 
substantially. At the beginning of the seventies the US economy was hit by the first oil crisis 
and suffered from stagflation - high unemployment combined with high inflation. The US 
Congress reacted to this development by introducing a series of restrictive immigration policy 
measures. This change in attitude is already reflected in H.R. 392 and H.R. 891, which passed 
the House of Representatives  in  1973  with  a clear majority. While the first  bill  contains 
provisions  for  employer  sanctions  to  tackle  the  growing  employment  of  undocumented 
immigrants,  the  second  bill  extended  the  applicability  of  the  20,000  per-country  cap  to 
migrants  from  the  Western  hemisphere  contained  in  the  1965  act.  This  measure  was 
particularly aimed at limiting immigration from Mexico (Gimpel and Edwards 1999).
6  
                                                 
6 The Immigration Act of 1965 had imposed per-country ceilings only for immigrants from Eastern hemisphere 
nations. The overall hemispheric caps have been 120,000 for Western hemisphere nations (North, and South 
America) and 170,000 for nations from the Eastern hemisphere (Africa, Asia, Europe and Australia).   6 
In the following  years the dominant issue became the admission of refugees. The debate 
concerned  mainly  the  distinction  between  immigrants  and  refugees,  the  annual  limit  for 
refugees, the scope for resettlement assistance, language and vocational training, and medical 
care for newly arrived refugees. 
7  
1.2 1980-1990 
Following  the  introduction  of  restrictive  measures  on  immigration  from  the  Western 
hemisphere  and  the  growing  arrivals  of  refugees,  much  of  the  policy  debate  during  the 
eighties  focused  on  the  strong  increase  in  the numbers  of  illegal  immigrants  and  asylum 
seekers, especially from Haiti, El-Salvador and Cuba (Tichenor 1994). While we exclude bills 
focusing  on  refugees  from  our  analysis,
8  we capture the discussion on illegal migration 
looking at various bills which have been voted on in the House of Representatives (H.R. 1510, 
H.R. 3810, H.R. 4222). The two most important pieces of legislation in this context are the 
Simpson-Mazzoli Bill (H.R. 1510), introduced in 1982 and named after its sponsors, and the 
Immigration  Reform  and Control  Act (H.R. 3810, IRCA) of 1986. The two measures  are 
closely intertwined, since the latter is a revised version of the former. 
During the 97
th congress senator Alan Simpson (Republican, Wyoming) and congressman 
Romano Mazzoli (Democrat, Kentucky) took the initiative to introduce an important reform 
of the US immigration legislation. One major provision of the bill was to make it illegal to 
knowingly hire or recruit undocumented immigrants, and the proposed legislation introduced 
also  financial  and  other  penalties  for  those  employing  illegal  aliens.  A  second  major 
component was the requirement for employers to attest their employees' immigration status. 
Last but not least, the proposed legislation granted an amnesty to certain agricultural seasonal 
workers and immigrants who entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and had lived 
in the US continuously ever since. The bill proposal was - from its very introduction on the 
Senate floor in 1982 - very controversial. The introduction of sanctions for employers drew 
strong  opposition  from  liberal  democrats,  business  groups  and  the  Hispanic  Caucus. 
Furthermore, the House leadership did not favor the idea of such a controversial bill reaching 
the floor for final voting in an election year. For these reasons Mazzoli decided finally to pull 
                                                 
7  The  general  distinction  between  refugees  and  immigrants  is  that  the  latter  group  leaves  their  country 
voluntarily, while the first group has to leave their country due to religious or political persecution (Gimpel and 
Edwards 1999). 
8 Refugees and asylum seekers usually do not gain immediately access to the host country’s labor  market. 
Furthermore, “warm glow” is likely to play an important role in shaping the voting behavior on policy measures 
towards refugees and asylum seekers (see Hatton 2004, Hatton and Williamson 2005).   7 
the bill from the floor and to reintroduce it in the 98
th congress (Lowell et al. 1986, Gimpel 
and Edwards 1999). 
The leadership structure in the House remained nearly unchanged in the 98
th congress and the 
Simpson-Mazzoli  Bill  faced  again  considerable  controversy.  After  passing  the  different 
subcommittees, House floor action saw the consideration of 69 amendments. Most of the 
debate focused on the employer sanctions and the amnesty provisions. In particular, it was 
feared that the latter provision would have a dramatic impact on the numbers of immigrants 
that would be admitted in the US, because legalized immigrants were to be allowed to bring 
their relatives under the 1965 preference system (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). After much 
debate, the bill passed the House with a 216 to 211 vote, with a margin of only five votes, one 
of  the  narrowest  in  the  whole  immigration  debate.  Since  the  bill  passed  the  Senate  in  a 
different version, the two texts went to a House-Senate conference committee, where they 
died as no compromise could be reached.  
The push for a comprehensive immigration reform was strong enough for a new version of the 
bill to be introduced in the 99
th congress in both chambers. The main difference from the 
original proposal was the addition of a temporary program for agricultural workers, which 
was requested by the agricultural lobby and strongly opposed by organized labor (Gimpel & 
Edwards 1999). The new version of the bill finally passed both chambers and was enacted on 
November 6, 1986 by President Reagan. The direction of the policy change brought about by 
the bill is not straightforward to assess, due to the variety of different provisions contained in 
the legislation. Two features of IRCA appear to be prominent though. First, it allowed almost 
3.5  million  illegal  immigrants  to  be  legalized  as  permanent  immigrants  (LeMay  2006). 
Furthermore, the bill implemented a controversial guest-worker initiative in the tradition of 
the Bracero program, which enabled a legal temporary inflow of unskilled farm workers. For 
these reason, and following also Tichenor (1994), we have classified the IRCA as being pro 
immigration.  Since  the  restrictionist  impetus  was  much  clearer  in  the  original  Simpson-
Mazzoli Bill, we have followed the literature and classified it as being against immigration 
liberalization.
9  
The other measure included in our analysis was aimed at a more generous handling of illegal 
immigrants and in particular H.R. 4222 extended the legalization provisions of the IRCA act 
by six months.
10 
                                                 
9 In a robustness check available upon request from the authors, we have verified that all our results are robust to 
the exclusion of the IRCA bill from our sample. 
10 Originally the amnesty program was scheduled to run from May 1987 to May 1988.   8 
1.3 1990-2000 
The first major legislation of this period was the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT). In 
contrast to IRCA, this bill focused mainly on legal immigration and had two main goals: the 
revision of the existing visa allocation system and the introduction of new provisions for 
skilled  immigration.  The  system  based  on  the  Immigration  and  Nationality  Act  of  1965 
heavily  emphasized  family  reunification  and  in  particular  it  excluded  immediate  relatives 
from  the  annual  immigration  cap.  As  a  consequence,  the  number  and  share  of  European 
immigrants had steadily decreased during the previous two decades, while the numbers of 
visas issued to immigrants of Asian and Latin American descent had increased dramatically. 
For this  reason  the  IMMACT established a new preference scheme with three categories: 
family- based immigration (approximately 74% of total), employment and business related 
immigration (20 percent of total) and a new diversity category (6 percent of total). Under the 
second category, people are admitted on the basis of skills and occupations, while the third 
category allocates green cards through a lottery program. The goal of the last category is to 
increase the number of immigrants from countries, which previously had a low number of 
admissions. In practice, the role of family reunification and labor market shortages driven 
immigration was not altered substantially (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). The major change 
introduced by the legislation was the increase of the annual cap for legal permanent residents 
from approximately 500,000 to 700,000. Finally, the act established also a short-term amnesty 
program to grant legal residence to up to 165,000 spouses and minor children of immigrants, 
who were legalized under the IRCA. 
As  it  soon  became  apparent,  the  IRCA  had  failed  to  stem  the  problem  of  undocumented 
immigrants entering the US. This increased the pressure on US policy makers to deal with 
illegal immigration. One result was the introduction, in 1994, of the so-called Proposition 187 
in  California.
11 The proposition prevented illegal immigrants from having access to most 
public services, including public education, and was approved in a referendum by almost 60% 
of those entitled to vote. The measure became state law, but it was later ruled unconstitutional 
by a federal court. Still, the message to Congress was clear and the Californian delegation was 
very  active  in  trying  to  put  immigration  reform  high  on  Congress’  agenda  (Gimpel  and 
Edwards 1999, Le May 2006). A result of this initiative and of the following debates is the 
second major immigration legislation of the nineties:  the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
                                                 
11 California, Texas and Florida are the states, which have received the largest numbers of both illegal and legal 
immigrants during the nineties.   9 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (H. R. 2202) of 1996. Initially, the act increased the size of the 
U.S. Border Patrol to 10,000 agents over five years and mandated the construction of fences 
at  the  most  heavily  trafficked  areas  of  the  U.S.-Mexico  border.  Furthermore,  the  bill 
introduced a pilot program to check the immigration status of job applicants. A third and very 
important  provision  made  the  deportation  of  illegal  immigrants  substantially  easier. 
Previously, immediate deportation was triggered only for offences that could lead to five 
years or more in jail. Under the new act, minor offences such as shoplifting, were making an 
individual eligible for deportation. Last but not least the law restricted the federal benefits to 
illegal and legal migrants (e.g. an alien who is not lawfully present in the U.S. is ineligible for 
social security benefits). The bill entered into force on September 30, 1996. 
1.4 2000-present 
The immigration policy in the recent years has been mainly influenced by concerns about 
illegal immigration and national security. The facts of September 11, 2001 and the fear of 
additional terrorist attacks have been very powerful catalysts, which have led Congress to 
adopt a number of new measures on immigration. In line with this, all of the bills from this 
period which are included in our analysis (H.R. 4437, H.R. 418, H.R. 4830, H.R. 6094, H.R. 
6061, and H.R. 6095) are aimed at reducing illegal immigration and at tightening immigration 
law enforcement.  
The most controversial and substantial legislative proposal was the Border Protection, Anti-
terrorism,  and  Illegal  Immigration  Control  Act  of  2005  (H.R.  4437).  One  of  the  major 
provisions of the bill was the building of a fence along the US-Mexican border up to 700 
miles (1120 km) long, at points with the highest number of illegal border crossings. Secondly, 
the act required the federal government to take custody of undocumented aliens detained by 
local authorities. This would put an end to the practice of "catch and release", whereby federal 
officials instructed local law enforcement officers to release detained undocumented aliens 
due to a lack of resources. Furthermore, the act would have introduced a fine of $3,000 to all 
undocumented aliens, who were captured in the US and had previously agreed to leave the 
country voluntarily. Finally, the bill would have subjected a person who supports or hosts 
undocumented immigrant to up to five years in prison (Fetzer 2006). The bill was - amongst 
other events - the catalyst of the 2006 U.S. immigrant rights protests, during which US cities 
were floaded by hundreds of thousands of immigrants and their supporters demonstrating 
against  the  new  immigration  policy.  The  bill  passed  the  House  of  Representatives  on 
December 16, 2005 by a narrow vote of 239 to 182. However, it did not pass the Senate and is   10 
therefore the only major immigration bill that did not became public law in the period we are 
considering in our analysis. 
A series of less pervasive legislative initiatives have been instead introduced during the same 
period. The Real ID Act (H.R. 418) establishes regulations for State driver's licenses and new 
security  standards  for  identification  documents.  It  mainly  addresses  the  issue  of  illegal 
immigration, because it requires every driver's license applicant to present a proof of lawful 
immigration  status.  The  Border  Tunnel  Prevention  Act  (H.R.  4830)  prohibits  instead  the 
unauthorized construction, financing, or use of tunnels or subterranean passages that cross the 
international  border  between  the  United  States  and  another  country.  The  Community 
Protection  Act  of  2008  (H.R.  6094)  contains  various  measures  that  greatly  simplify  the 
detention of dangerous aliens, that ensure the removal of deportable criminal aliens, and that 
enhance  police officers’ ability to  combat alien gang crime. The  Secure Fence Act  (H.R. 
6061) reignited the debate on a fence at the Southern border, which was already proposed in 
the controversial Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 
2005. The new bill led to the construction of over 700 miles of double-reinforced fence along 
the border with Mexico in areas that have experienced illegal drug trafficking and illegal 
immigration. Finally, the Immigration Law Enforcement Act of 2006 (H.R. 6095) intends to 
strengthen  the  position  of  state  and  local  authorities  in  dealing  with  the  enforcement  of 
immigration laws. Alien smugglers shall be more effectively prosecuted and an explicit effort 
shall be made to end the practice of “catch and release”. 
2. Theoretical framework 
To analyze the drivers of the voting behavior of individual representatives, we consider a 
simple model with D heterogeneous districts. Each district is populated by low skilled and 
high skilled individuals - and we assume the supply of each production factor to be potentially 
heterogeneous across agents. District i is populated by Li N  low skilled agents and  Hi N  high 
skilled  ones,  so  that  the  total  population  is  given  by Li Hi N N N .  Furthermore, 
let N
N Li
Li ,  Li
Hi
Hi N
N 1  be respectively the share of low and high skilled in the 
domestic population.  
Districts  are  heterogeneous  with  respect  to  the  relative  size  of  the  skilled  and  unskilled 
populations. Each district produces only one output good according to the same, constant 
returns to scale production technology Y=F(H,L), which can be expressed in intensive units as   11 
y=f(h),  where  y=Y/L,  h=H/L  etc.  The  production  function  is  well  behaved  with  f’(h)>0, 
f’’(h)<0. Perfect competition in factor markets insures that the equilibrium rate of return to 
human capital r is given by r=f’(h), while the wage rate w is w=f(h)-hf’(h). In this simple 
setting, individuals care only about their income.  
The preferences of native individual residing in the district are represented by the district’s 
congressman. In choosing whether to support or not an immigration policy, the representative 
maximizes  the  utility  level  of  the  average  citizen.
12  Thus, the representative’s  objective 
function can be written as  
h r h w W Li Li 1    (1) 
Two alternative policy options are available to the representative: maintaining the status quo, 
or adopting a measure that will change the human capital - labor ratio in the population. This 
simple setting captures the main features of our data, from which we have information on 
whether a congressman votes in favor or against a policy that increases the relative supply of 
unskilled labor.  
The main result of our analysis can be summarized in the following 
Proposition 1 The likelihood that a representative will support a more open migration policy 
towards the more (less) skilled is increasing in the share of the low (highly) skilled in the 
district’s population.  
Proof:  From  equation  (1)  and  the  factor  market  equilibrium  conditions,  we  know 
0 ) ( ' ' 1 i i Li Li
i
i h f h
h
W
 if and only if
i
Li h 1
1 ) ( , given that  0 ) ( ' ' i h f  





, which establishes the result.  
As  long  as  the  relative  weight  attached  to  skilled  labor  in  the  objective  function  of  the 





increase  (decrease)  in  the  skilled  labor  supply  is  viewed  favorably  (negatively)  by  the 
politician. Across jurisdictions, a district with a higher share of low (highly) skilled in the 
                                                 
12  The  choice  of  this  objective  function  can  be  rationalized  in  a  probabilistic  voting  setting  in  which  two 
candidates compete for the seat in Congress and do not know the true preferences of the median voter. For more 
on this issue, see Drazen (2000).   12 
population is more (less) likely to favor an inflow of skilled immigrants. The working of 
proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1, and represents the main prediction we will assess in 








Figure 1: Skilled and unskilled abundant districts 
 
3. Data and summary statistics 
The data for our analysis comes from various sources. We start by using the Congressional 
Roll  Call  Voting  Dataset  of  the  Policy  Agenda  Project  and  the  Library  of  Congress 
(THOMAS) to identify and collect information on all legislative votes in the US House of 
Representatives which are related to immigration issues between 1970 and 2006. Roll call 
votes  are  recorded  votes  that  enable  to  observe  individual  voting  behavior  of  House 
representatives on single bills and amendments.
13 Since both data bases provide only rough 
information about the content of the bills ,  we  have  supplemented  them using additional 
                                                 
13 Beside recorded votes, two additional types of votes take place in the House: The first is “voice voting”, which 
is usually employed when a question is introduced on the floor. By this method the congressmen who are in 
favour of the bill or amendment shout in unison “Aye”, followed by those voting “No”. In the case of a standing 
or division the principle is the same, except that the representatives who are in favour will rise and stand until 
counted instead of shouting. In both cases only the vote totals are announced, and no individual member votes 
are recorded. Votes are recorded by electronic device if  they are demanded by at least of one  fifth of the 
members present or if they are demanded by one member in the case that the quorum is not present (Davis 
2006).  The  demand  for  recorded  votes  is  a  sign  for  a  lack  of  consensus  and  indicates  the  presence  of  a 
controversial decision process (Gimpel and Edwards 1999).   13 
resources, like the Congressional Quarterly publications and existing historical accounts like 
the one by Gimpel and Edwards (1999), to identify immigration related bills. In the second 
step, we use the full text of the legislation to classify the bills into four categories according to 
their  main  topic:  general  immigration,  illegal  migration,  refugees  and  asylum,  and 
naturalization  and  integration.  We  restrict  our  analysis  to  bills  belonging  to  the  first  two 
categories, because those are the ones most directly linked to the inflow of foreign labor.  
Furthermore, in our analysis we concentrate on bills with a potential impact on the supply of 
unskilled labor. In particular, for the purpose of our analysis an immigration bill is a piece of 
legislation that can have either a direct positive or negative impact on the size of the unskilled 
labor force in the US if it would come into force. We therefore exclude – for instance - bills 
that  deal  primarily  with  the  provision  of  public  goods  to  illegal  migrants  or  federal 
reimbursement of health and education costs to states. Finally, we focus on final passage 
votes, which determine whether a bill passes the House or not. In doing so, we exclude votes 
on amendments which take place during the decision process on the House floor.
14 We have 
decided to follow this strategy, because the expectations on the effects of floor amendments 
are less clear than for final passage votes. Voting on amendments is likely to be connected to 
strategic voting and therefore is less likely to distinctly reflect the interests of the legislator’s 
constituency.
15 Table 1 illustrates votes on immigration legislation that took place  in the US 
House of Representatives between 1970 and 2006, which satisfy the criteria discussed a bove 
and therefore constitute the basis of our empirical analysis.  As it can be easily seen, most of 
the votes are relatively close, and this reflects the controversial nature of immigration  policy 
in the United States. For detailed information on the content of the various bills and their role 
in the history of US immigration policy, see the discussion in section 2. 
Next, we combine our data on immigration bills with the corresponding records of individual 
voting behavior of House representatives. This inf ormation is provided by the VOTEVIEW 
project (http://voteview.ucsd.edu) of Poole and Rosenthal (1997), which offers data  on US 
congressmen voting behavior from 1798 to the present. In addition to this, the VOTEVIEW 
database contains a number of variables like the name of congressman, his party affiliation, 
                                                 
14 For a comprehensive overview about the legislative process on the house floor see Davis (2006).  
15 For example, amendments can be used to kill bills on the floor. A well-known example in the political science 
literature is the “Powell amendment” of 1956. It referred to a House bill which was meant to increase federal 
funding for school construction. The Powell amendment proposed that funding should only be given to school 
districts which are free of racial segregation. Empirical evidence suggests that legislators anticipated that the 
adoption of the amendment would lead to a rejection of the related aid-to-education bill. The voting behavior of 
the legislators on the Powell amendment was therefore strongly influenced by strategic interests (Poole and 
Rosenthal 1997).   14 
state, and congressional district that enable us to distinctly identify the legislators and link 
them to their constituency. Finally, we combine our data on individual voting records with 
information on the economic and non-economic characteristics of electoral constituencies. For 
this we use mainly Census data. However, for the period 1970 to 1990 the US Census bureau 
provides no information at the district level. For this period we instead use data from the 
Congressional District Data Files of Adler (2003) and Lublin (1997), who have aggregated 
Census data at the congressional district level taking into account the decennial redistricting.
16  
Our dependent variable is the representative’s voting behavior on immigration bills Voteijt In 
the  case  of  bills  liberalizing  immigration  a  vote  coded  1  indicates  that  the  district 
representative  votes  in  favor  of  more  open  immigration  and  0  otherwise.  In  the  case  of 
legislations restricting immigration a vote is coded 0 if the representative’s vote is in favor of 
restricting immigration and 1 otherwise. The main explanatory variable of interest  in our 
analysis is the skill ratio of a congressional district, SkillRatioit, which is measured as the ratio 
of high-skilled individuals  over 25 to  total  population  over 25 at  time  t  in  congressional 
district  i.  High-skilled  individuals  are  defined  as  those  having  earned  at  least  a  bachelor 
degree. According to our theoretical model we expect that the likelihood to vote in favor of 
liberalizing the immigration of unskilled workers increases with the share of the highly skilled 
population at working age.  
Further  economic  controls  at  the  district  level  are  unemployment  and  the  share  of  farm 
workers. We define unemployment as the share of unemployed individuals as a percentage of 
the total labor force. The share of farm workers, measured as the number of farm workers 
relatively  to  the  total  labor  force,  proxies  for  the  size  of  the  agricultural  sector  within  a 
congressional district. Moreover, we also control for the industrial structure of a district by 
including the share of individuals employed in manufacturing, construction and wholesale and 
retail in the total labor force. To capture the role of welfare state drivers, we use the median family 
income of a congressional district. 
Furthermore, we include a number of explanatory variables providing  information  on the 
ideological  characteristics  of  the  representative/district.  In  particular,  we  capture  the 
ideological orientation of a representative by looking at his/her party affiliation and at the first 
                                                 
16  The  geographic  definition  of  congressional  districts  changes  following  each  census.  During  the  109th 
congress, i.e. in the years 2005 and 2006, each of the 435 House representatives has represented on average 
about 650,000 people. In the construction of their data, Adler (2003) and Lublin (1997) use Congressional Data 
Books and associated data files which provide information about the restricting after decennial census.   15 
dimension of the DW nominate score.
17  This index is provided by the VOTEVIEW project 
(http://voteview.ucsd.edu) and increases in congressman’s conservatism. As an alternative, we 
also use the ADA score, which evaluates every congressman on a scale from 0 to 100, with 
higher scores assigned to more liberal politicians.
18 The latter is constructed by the American 
for Democratic Action, a lobby group, and the main difference with the DW nominate score is 
that it uses only votes on a subsample of bills, whereas the DW nominate score  makes use of 
every  roll call votes in each congress ,  and is based on  a more  sophisticated estimation 
procedure. Furthermore, we use the share of Democratic votes in the past election as a proxy 
for the ideological orientation of a congressional district.
19 As additional controls we included 
also information on the political affiliation of the House majority  and of the US President. 
Finally, we consider data on contributions from Political Action Committees (PACs) which 
comes from the Federal Election Commission (http://www.fec.gov/). 
To study the role of immigrant networks and additional ethnic characteristics of the district,  
we use Census data, and measure the share of foreign-born, Afro-Americans and Hispanics in 
a  district’s  population.  By  controlling  for  the  change  in  the  share  of  the  foreign  born 
population over time we account for the possibility that recent inflows of migrants might 
affect congressmen’ preferences towards prospective immigration differently than the existing 
stock of foreign workers. Furthermore, we incorporate the ethnic background of congressmen 
by controlling whether a congressman is of Afro-American or Hispanic descent. These data is 
based  on  registers  provided  by  the  Congressional  Hispanic  Caucus 
(http://velazquez.house.gov/chc/)  and  the  Congressional  Black  Caucus 
(http://www.thecongressionalblackcaucus.com/). 
Finally,  we  explore  also  the  additional  role  played  by  geography  in  shaping  voting  on 
immigration policy. To this end, we include the share of the population living in urban areas, 
to  capture potential  differences  in  attitudes  towards immigration between rural  and urban 
areas. We further investigate cross-state differences in voting on immigration bills by running 
separate regressions for congressmen from South-Western and high immigration states. 
                                                 
17 The second dimension of the DW score measures for our observation period the conflict about civil rights for 
African-Americans. 
18 The ADA score is calculated annually on the basis of 20 selected key votes on a wide range of social and 
economic issues, both domestic and international. The selection is made by the ADA`s legislative committee 
without providing clear selection criteria. From the bills included in our analyses no one has been used for the 
construction of the ADA score. 
19 Data on share of Democratic votes comes from Lee et al. (2004) and for the 109th congress from Chandler et 
al. (2008).   16 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for  the variables we have described above. Over the 
entire observation period, 36% of the representatives voted in favor of freer immigration. 
However, there are noteworthy differences over time: while up to 1990 almost 41% of the 
district  representatives  supported  freer  immigration,  after  1990  this  figure  declined 
substantially, to only about 32% of the total votes. These figures closely reflect the declining 
support towards unskilled immigration which we have documented in section 2. The data on 
the  skill  composition  of  the  resident  population  suggests  instead  that  on  average,  in  our 
sample almost one out of five Americans over 25 holds at least a bachelor degree. This rather 
high figure is in part due to the fact that out of the twelve bills we have included in our final 
sample, five have been introduced during the 109
th congress i.e. between 2005 and 2006.
20  
The skill ratio of the population shows, like the voting behavior  on immigration, a strong 
variation across congressional districts , and the main goal of our paper is to investigate 
whether there exists a systematic relationship between a representative’s voting behavior on 
immigration and the relative skill composition of his home district. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate 
very clearly this point. Focusing on the congressional districts of New York state, we plot in 
Figure  1  the  votes  cast  on  the  Border  Protection,  Anti-terrorism  and  Illegal  Immigration 
Control Act (H.R. 4437) introduced during the 109
th congress. In Figure 2, on the other hand, 
we use census data to construct the district level share of highly skilled in the population. As 
it  can  be  easily  seen,  almost  all  congressmen  who  supported  less  restrictive  immigration 
legislation  represented  districts  with  skill  ratios  above  average.
21  However,  the  figure 
illustrates also that not all representatives from districts with high skill ratios voted in favor of 
a liberal immigration policy. This highlights the necessity to  systematically  control  for 
additional economic and non-economic characteristics of the constituencies, and we will do so 
in the next section. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
As the theoretical model suggests, the voting behavior of an individual representative on a 
migration policy bill aimed at expanding the inflow of unskilled workers is a function of the 
district’s skill composition. In particular, representatives of districts, which are more skilled-
                                                 
20 The educational attainment in the US has substantially improved during the recent years. Within the period 
1970  to 2000  the  population  share  over  25  with  bachelor  degree  or  more  increased  from  10.7%  to  24.4% 
(Baumann and Graf 2003). The bills H.R.4830 and H.R.2578 are not included in our final sample since they are 
characterized by a unanimous vote. 
21 The average skill ratio of New York’s congressional districts during the 109
th congress is 20%.   17 
labor abundant  are  expected to  favor bills  liberalizing unskilled migration. To assess  our 
theoretical prediction, we estimate the following probit model: 
s t s t it it it it I I I I X Skill Z Vote prob 2 1 ) | 1 (  (2) 
where  it Vote  is a dichotomous variable taking value of one if the representative elected in 
district i votes in favor of a bill liberalizing unskilled immigration at time t, Φ(.) represents the 
cumulative distribution function of a standard normal,  it Skill  is the share of the population 
over 25 years old with at least a bachelor’s degree,  it X is a vector of additional explanatory 
variables specific to district i and  is the vector of parameters to be estimated. Furthermore, 
in all specifications, we include time (It ) and state fixed effects (Is) to account for unobserved, 
additive time- and state-specific effects,
22 and we also allow for the effect of state -specific 
unobserved shocks to vary over time, by considering a full set of two ways interactions  (It x 
Is). In order to simplify the interpretation of our results, all our tables report marginal effects. 
Thus, our estimates capture the change in the probability of voting in favor of a more open 
immigration policy due to an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable, 
and a discrete change in the probability for dichotomous variables. 
Table 3 contains our main specifications. Our initial set of regressions (columns 1-3) focuses 
on the effects of economic drivers that work through the labor market. As suggested by our 
theoretical model, we find that labor market complementarities are important: Representatives 
from districts where the share of skilled workers in the population is higher are more likely to 
support  immigration  policies  aimed  at  increasing  the  supply  of  unskilled  workers.  This 
finding is robust and holds throughout our specifications – once we include additional district 
level controls.  
Furthermore, column (2) indicates a positive relationship between a district’s unemployment 
rate and voting on liberalizing low-skilled immigration. As it will turn out, this finding – 
which is somewhat counterintuitive but common in the literature (see for instance Gimpel and 
Edwards 1999) – is likely to be due to an omitted variable bias (see column 11).  
To control for the importance of the sectoral dimension of employment, the role of which has 
been emphasized for instance by Gonzalez and Kamdra (2006), we also include the share of 
                                                 
22 We use state rather than district fixed effects because the use of district fixed effects over a long time horizon 
is  problematic,  since  the  geographic  definition  of  congressional  districts  changes  following  each  decennial 
census. See also footnote 16.   18 
workers employed in agriculture (column 3). A priori, the sign of the correlation between the 
importance of agriculture and voting behavior on migration policies favoring the unskilled is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, as unskilled (and illegal) migrants are very likely to end up 
working in agriculture (Hanson and Spilimbergo 1999, 2001), we expect them to compete 
with native workers in that sector, and the larger is the share of domestic workers employed in 
agriculture in a given district, the less likely the district representative will be to support open 
migration policies. On the other hand, the more important is agriculture in the economy of a 
given district, the more likely it is that interest groups representing this sector will be able to 
convince politicians that they need an abundant labor supply (possibly made up by immigrant 
workers) to keep agriculture competitive. Empirically, we find that the share of farm workers 
is negatively correlated with the likelihood to vote in favor of immigration liberalization, but 
the result we find in column (3), as we will discuss later on, does not turn out to be robust.  
In the second set of regressions (column 4), we capture instead the role of the welfare state. 
There  is  an  abundant  literature  highlighting  the  importance  of  this  channel  in  shaping 
individual-level  attitudes  towards  immigration  (Hanson,  Scheve  and  Slaughter  2007, 
Dustmann and Preston 2007, Facchini and Mayda 2009), and thus we expect the welfare state 
to be also an important driver of individual representatives’ voting behavior. In particular, in 
the presence of cross-district redistribution carried out by the welfare state, we expect richer 
constituencies to be less favorable towards unskilled immigration, as unskilled immigrants are 
net receivers of benefits from the welfare state.  
Our  findings  are  broadly  consistent  with  the  theoretical  expectations.  Representatives  of 
richer districts are substantially less likely to support unskilled immigration (column 4), and 
this result is very robust to the introduction of additional controls (column 5-11).
23  
The third channel we consider, whose importance has also been highlighted in the literature 
(Gimpel and Edwards 1999), is the political/ideological channel. First, we control for the 
representative’s party affiliation. We find that belonging to the Democratic Party is positively 
and  significantly  correlated  with  the  likelihood  of  voting  in  favor  of  immigration 
liberalization (column 5 of Table 3). This result is in line with earlier findings by Gimpel and 
Edwards (1999), who conclude that “recorded votes on immigration policy have become more 
partisan over time, even after controlling for alternative influences on congressional decision 
                                                 
23 Notice that –as we include a full set of state and year interactions in all our empirical analysis - we cannot 
separately control for the extent of redistribution carried out at the state level.   19 
making such as region and constituency characteristics.”
24 Interestingly, it is worth noticing 
that accounting for the representative’s party affiliation substantially reduces the effect of the 
share of farm workers on the congressman voting behavior, reducing its magnitude. This 
suggests that the results in columns (3) through (4) were driven by an omitted variable bias. 
Indeed, district characterized by a higher employment share in agriculture tend also to be 
more conservative, and without controlling for ideology the sectoral composition effect was 
confounded with the ideological dimension.  
An elected representative’s party affiliation is only an imprecise proxy for a district’s partisan 
leaning, as it has been recently argued for instance by Lee et al. (2004). For this reason, in 
column  6  we  also  control  for  the  extent  of  party  strength  in  the  previous  election. 
Interestingly, we find that representatives of districts with a higher share of Democratic votes 
in  the  last  congressional  election  are  more  likely  to  support  legislations  liberalizing 
immigration.  
In the last five columns of Table 3 (specifications 7-11) we examine the role of what we name 
the geographic and network channels. It is well known that migrants tend to concentrate in 
urban areas (Card 2009) and thus it is important to understand whether congressmen elected 
in more urban constituencies vote differently from those elected in more rural areas.  The 
result  in  column  (7)  suggests  that  the  likelihood  of  congressmen  to  support  more  open 
immigration policies towards unskilled labor increases with the share of the population living 
in  urban  areas.  Importantly,  our  findings  in  column  (8)  highlight  that  representatives  of 
districts with a higher share of foreign-born are more likely to vote in favor of liberalizing 
unskilled  immigration.  There  are  at  least  two  possible  explanations  for  why  existing 
immigrants might have a preference for liberalizing immigration even if they are likely to end 
up competing in the labor market with the new immigrants: social and family networks, and 
identification with minorities. In the first case, individuals prefer freer immigration because it 
helps relatives and friends from abroad to enter the US – this channel has been found to be 
very important also in the labor market (Munshi 2003). The second channel refers instead to 
the situation in which previous immigrants identify with new immigrants due to their own 
immigration experience.  
To assess the effects of shocks to the demographic composition of a district, in column (9) we 
also control for the growth rate in the share of foreign born (Money 1997). Interestingly, we 
                                                 
24 The authors provide evidence that the cleavage between Republicans and Democrats have steadily increased 
since the 96th congress (1979-80), whereas Republicans tended to oppose liberalized immigration.    20 
find  that  recent  spikes  in  the  share  of  foreign  born  are  negatively  correlated  with  the 
probability of congressmen to support immigration liberalization, even though the results are 
not statistically significant.  
Finally, in column (10) and (11) we assess the role played by the racial composition of the 
district, focusing on the importance of the share of Hispanics and African-Americans. While 
we don’t find a significant relationship between congressmen’s voting behavior and the share 
of Hispanics in the population, the positive and significant  coefficient for Afro-American 
suggests that the identification with minorities might be important.
25 Indeed, there is some 
evidence suggesting that African American  legislators tend to see  the immigration issue 
within a minority rights framework. Based on the ideas of civil rights and equal opportunity 
they  build  political  coalitions  with  other  ethnic  minorities  and  tend  to  support  open 
immigration policies (Gimpel and Edwards 1999, Gonzales and Kamdar 2000, Fetzer 2006). 
Interestingly, accounting for the share of African American in the population makes the 
unemployment rate statistically insignificant at conventional levels. This suggests that our 
previous findings were driven by an omitted variable bias: Afro-Americans are more likely to 
be unemployed, and representatives of districts with a high share of Afro-Americans are more 
likely to support open immigration policies.
26 
To conclude, the results in Table 3 provide strong support fo r the predictions of our simple 
theoretical  model.  Congressmen’s  are  more  likely  to  support  measures  increasing  the 
availability of unskilled labor the higher is the share of high skilled workers in a given district. 
This result is robust to the introduction of additional economic channels – like the welfare 
state channel, and other non-economic channels, like the political/ideological channel and 
additional geographic/network controls which affect legislators voting behavior.  
5. Robustness checks 
In this section we assess the robustness of our main results in a number of ways. We start by 
considering in Table 4 alternative measures of the role played by economic characteristics of 
the district. In column (1) we replace the share of highly skilled– defined as the fraction of 
individual over 25, which have completed at least a bachelor degree - with the share of low 
skilled individuals (Alternative SkillRatio) - defined as the share of individuals which have 
                                                 
25 The insignificance of the coefficient for Hispanics might be driven by the small size of the Hispanic 
population during the early congresses. 
26 Indeed, we also run a specification identical to the  one reported in column 11, from which we excluded the 
unemployment share, and the coefficient on Afro-American is positive and strongly significant. The results are 
available upon request from the authors.   21 
completed  less  than  four  years  of  high  school.  Our  results  are  in  line  with  the  model 
predictions: The likelihood of congressmen to vote in favor of freer unskilled immigration is 
negatively correlated with share of the unskilled population in the constituency. The results 
for  the  impact  of  other  district  characteristics  are  similar  to  the  ones  in  our  preferred 
specification, i.e. column (11) of Table 3.  
In the remainder of Table 4 we further explore the role played by sectoral employment. In 
column (2) we modify our benchmark specification (column 11 in Table 3) by controlling for 
the share of employment in manufacturing, whereas in column (3) we consider employment 
in the construction and retail sectors. In neither case is the sign and significance of our main 
explanatory  variable  affected.  Interestingly,  representatives  of  districts  in  which 
manufacturing is more important tend to be less favorable towards unskilled immigration, 
whereas the opposite is true for districts in which construction and retail play a bigger role 
(even though the latter effect is not statistically significant).  
We  turn  next  to  consider  in  Table  5  several  robustness  checks  concerning  the 
political/ideological  channel.  We  start  by  replacing,  in  column  (1)  the  legislator’s  party 
affiliation, with his/her DW nominate score, where a higher score indicates that the politician 
is  more  `conservative’  (see  section  4  for  the  definition).  Our  results  suggest  that  more 
conservative politicians are more likely to vote against pro-immigration measures, but once 
again the sign and significance of our main explanatory variable is hardly affected. In column 
(2) the representative’s ideological leaning is instead measured using the ADA score, where a 
higher score indicates that the politician is more liberal (see section 4 for the definition). The 
findings in column (2) are fairly comparable to those in column (1). In columns (3) and (4) we 
control respectively for whether the politician belongs to the House majority and for whether 
a politician in the majority belongs also to the same party as the president. In both cases, 
belonging  to  the  House  majority  has  a  negative  impact  on  the  likelihood  to  support  a 
liberalization in immigration policy towards the unskilled, but our main result on the role of 
the labor market channel are hardly affected. 
So far our analysis of the drivers of an individual representative’s voting behavior has focused 
on the role played by the characteristics of the district’s average voter. At the same time, it has 
been widely argued that in democratic societies the aggregation of individual preferences is 
likely to be a much richer process. In particular, when it turns to immigration policy, a recent 
strand of the literature has emphasized the activities carried out by pressure groups (Facchini 
and Willmann 2005, Facchini, Mayda and Mishra 2008, Hanson and Spilimbergo 2001). For   22 
instance,  Facchini,  Mayda  and  Mishra  (2008)  have  used  a  new  dataset,  which  allows  to 
identify the purpose of the lobbying activity to show that in the United States lobbying at the 
sectoral level has a statistically significant and important effect on the allocation of work and 
related visas across sectors. To assess the role of organized groups on the voting behavior of 
elected representatives unfortunately we cannot follow the same procedure, as the data used 
by Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2008) does not allow for the identification of the politician, 
which  has  been  contacted  by  the  lobby.  We  use  instead  political  action  committee 
contributions  – which  are  available since 1979  – and can be easily traced to  the  elected 
official. In particular, we focus on the role played by contributions offered by corporations 
(PacCorporate) and by unions (PacLabor). The presumption is that corporations will favor 
more lax immigration policies as more immigrants will decrease labor costs, whereas unions 
are against this type of policies for exactly the same reason. As Political Action Committee 
Contributions  (PACs)  measure  lobbying  effort  on  a  variety  of  different  issues,  we  have 
considered a politician to have been “influenced” for the sake of immigration policy if the 
corporate (labor) contributions he/she has received are at or above the eightieth percentile of 
all corporate (labor) contributions in that year.
27 Interestingly, neither corporate nor labor 
PAC contributions appear to affect the voting behavior of elected officials on immigration 
policy (column 5). This finding resembles a similar result in Facchini, Mayda and Mishra 
(2008), where PAC contributions are also shown not to be a significant driver of immigration 
policy, whereas the opposite is true for lobbying expenditure.
28 More importantly, including 
lobbying does not affect the sign and significance of our main results.
29 
In Table 6 we consider two robustness checks on the network channel. As Latinos are by far 
the largest ethnic group among recent migrants in the US, we start by considering whether 
Hispanic congressmen behave differently from Non -Hispanic legislators, but we don’t find 
any conclusive evidence. This result has to be treated with caution though, as the number of 
Hispanic representatives in Congress has been very low for the first twenty-five years of our 
sample, and has increased substantially only starting from the mid nineties. Finally, in column 
(2)  we  look  at  whether  Black  congressmen  behave  differently  from  Non-Blacks  on 
immigration issues, and we find that members of the Black congressional caucus tend to be 
more in favor of open immigration policies (see also the discussion in Section 5).  
                                                 
27 We have experimented with different thresholds, and the results do not change substantially. 
28  As mentioned, PAC contributions are hard to trace to a particular issue, and as a result this is a rather 
imprecise measure of the intensity of the lobbying activity.  
29 Notice that the number of observations  in column (5) falls substantially, as we do not have measures of 
political action committee contributions before 1979, and therefore have to exclude observations on the first two 
bills in our sample.    23 
Finally, in table 7 we carry out a series of robustness checks involving the geography of 
immigration and changes in the sample size. In column (1) we carry out our analysis focusing 
only on the four major immigration reforms (H.R.3810, H.R.2202, H.R.4300, and H.R.4437. 
In column (2), we restrict our sample to the voting behavior of congressmen from the Sunbelt 
states,  which  are  characterized  by  strong  population  growth  during  the  decades  we  are 
considering. Finally, in column (3), we focus instead on legislators belonging to states which 
received large inflows of immigrants (the 15 states with the highest share of foreign-born in 
the population during our observation period). In all these cases our main results are not 
affected,  i.e.  the  expected  effect  of  immigration  on  the  district’s  labor  market  is  a  key 
determinant in the representative’s voting behavior. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have developed a simple theoretical model to analyze the drivers of the 
voting behavior of individual representatives on immigration policy, which emphasizes the 
role played by the skill composition of the constituency. Our model predicts that legislators 
will  be  more  (less)  likely  to  favor  a  policy  increasing  the  number  of  unskilled  (skilled) 
immigrants, the more skilled labor abundant is their district.  
We have assessed the predictions of our model on a novel dataset, which includes all US 
House of Representatives voting records on immigration policy over the period 1970-2006. 
We have found that labor market factors, as captured by the complementarity /substitutability 
between the domestic and foreign labor force are key drivers of congressmen voting behavior. 
Representatives from more skilled labor abundant districts are systematically more likely to 
support an unskilled immigration liberalization bill, while representatives from more unskilled 
labor abundant districts are less likely to do so. This result is remarkably robust and continues 
to hold when we control for a wealth of additional economic and non-economic drivers.  
As for future work, we plan to use the rich dataset we have constructed to investigate the 
voting behavior of elected politicians on different aspects of globalization. For instance, a 
simple  economic  Heckscher-Ohlin  model  would  suggest  that  international  trade  and 
international factor mobility should be substitutes from the point of view of the labor market 
effects,  since  international  trade  in  goods  can  effectively  be  thought  as  the  purchase  of 
embodied factor services. We plan to investigate whether this simple prediction holds in the 
data, i.e. whether given district economic characteristics a politician will vote in the same way 
on a measure increasing the supply of unskilled labor as he votes on a trade bill alleviating the   24 
import of labor-intensive products. We believe that answering these questions will greatly 
increase our understanding of the political economy of globalization.  
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 Table 1: Final passage votes on immigration issues in the House of Representatives 
1970-2006 
   Cong  Date  Bill  Topic  Keyword  Direction  Yes  No 
1  93  3.5.1973  H.R.392  Illegal 
Migration 
Employer Sanctions  Contra  297  63 
2  93  26.9.1973  H.R.891  Immigration  Rodino bill  Contra  336  30 
3  98  20.6.1984  H.R.1510  Illegal 
Migration 
Simpson-Mazzoli Bill  Contra  216  211 
4  99  9.10.1986  H.R.3810*  Illegal 
Migration 
Immigration Reform and 
Control Act (IRCA) 
Pro  230  166 
5  100  21.4.1988  H.R.4222  Illegal 
Migration 
Extension of legalization 
by 6 months 
Pro  213  202 
6  101  3.10.1990  H.R.4300*  Immigration  The 1990 Immigration Act 
(IMMACT) 
Pro  231  192 
7  104  21.3.1996  H.R.2202*  Illegal 
Immigration 
Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act 
Contra  333  87 
8  105  25.3.1998  H.R.2578  Immigration  Visa Waiver program  Pro  407  0 
9  109  10.2.2005  H.R.418  Illegal 
Migration 
Real ID Act  Contra  261  161 
10  109  16.12.2005  H.R.4437*  Illegal 
Migration 
Border Protection, Anti-
terrorism and Illegal 
Immigration Control Act 
Contra  239  182 
11  109  14.9.2006  H.R.6061  Illegal 
Migration 
Secure Fence Act  Contra  283  138 
12  109  21.9.2006  H.R.6094  Illegal 
Migration 
Community Protection Act 
of 2006 
Contra  328  95 
13  109  21.9.2006  H.R.4830  Illegal 
Migration 
Border Tunnel Prevention 
Act 
Contra  422  0 
14  109  21.9.2006  H.R.6095  Illegal 
Migration 
Immigration Law 
Enforcement Act of 2006 
Contra  277  140 
Cong and Date describe the congress/date in which/when the vote took place. Bill shows the name under which 
the bill is originating in the House of Representatives ("H.R."). Major immigration legislations are marked with 
an asterisk (*). Topic classifies the broad issue of the bill. Keyword provides some basic information about the 
content of the legislation. Direction shows whether the bill is pro or contra liberalizing immigration. Yes/No 
show the overall number of Yes/No Votes.    29 
Table 2: Summary Statistics  
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Vote ijt  4906  0.36  0.48  0  1 
SkillRatio it  4902  0.19  0.09  0.02  0.57 
Alternative SkillRatio it  4902  0.29  0.13  0.04  0.75 
Farm Worker it  4899  0.02  0.03  0.00  0.22 
Manufacturing it  4897  0.18  0.08  0.03  0.52 
Wholesale and Retail it  4899  0.17  0.03  0.09  0.43 
Construction it  4479  0.06  0.02  0.01  0.16 
Unemployment it  4899  0.06  0.02  0.02  0.22 
Family Income it  4906  33184  18977  30  91571 
Democrat it  4906  0.52  0.50  0  1 
Share Democrat Votes it  4890  0.53  0.25  0  1 
DW Nominate it  4906  0.03  0.43  -0.72  1.69 
ADA it  4779  45.48  37.15  0  100 
Majority it  4906  0.56  0.50  0  1 
MajorityPres it  4906  0.10  0.30  0  1 
PacLabor it  3898  0.20  0.40  0  1 
PacCorporate it  3898  0.20  0.40  0  1 
Urban it  4903  0.75  0.23  0.00  1.00 
Foreign-born it  4906  0.08  0.09  0.00  0.59 
FB growth it  4906  0.46  0.77  -0.82  6.00 
Afro-American it  4906  0.12  0.15  0.00  0.92 
Hispanic it  4752  0.09  0.14  0.00  0.84 
Hispanic Caucus it  4906  0.03  0.18  0  1 
Black Caucus it  4902  0.07  0.25  0  1 
Vote jit is coded as 1 if the representative of district i at time t votes on bill j in favor of immigration, 0 
otherwise. SkillRatio  it measures the percentage of the population over 25 with at least a bachelor 
degree. Alternative SkillRatio it is the percentage of the population over 25 with less than 4 years of 
High  School.  Farm  Worker  it  measures  the  share  of  farm  workers  in  the  total  labor  force. 
Manufacturing it describes the share of individuals employed in manufacturing in the total labor force. 
Wholesale  and  Retail  it,  respectively  Construction  it,  measure  the  share  of  people  employed  in 
wholesale and retail, respectively construction, in the total labor force. Unemployment it is the share of 
unemployed individuals in the total labor force. Family Income it measures the median family income 
within a district in dollars. Democrat  it is a dummy coded as 1 if the representative of the district 
belongs to the Democratic Party. Share Democrat Votes it is the Democratic share of the two-party 
vote at the past House elections. ADA it ranks every house representative on a scale from 0 to 100, with 
higher scores assigned to more liberal politicians. DW Nominate  it is an individual ideology score 
increasing in conservatism. Majority it is a dummy coded as 1 if the party of the district representative 
has the majority in the house, 0 otherwise. MajorityPres it is a dummy coded as 1 if the party of the 
district representative has the majority in the house and is the same like the one of the president of the 
US, 0 otherwise. Urban it describes the share of the population living in urban areas. PacLabor it and 
PacCorporate it are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the contributions from labor, respectively 
corporate, related Political Action Committees (PACs) of congressman i are above the 80th percentile 
of all Labor/Corporate PAC contributions in year t. Foreign-born it measures the share of foreign-born 
individuals in the total population. FB growth it measures how the share of Foreign-Born share has 
changed related to the previous period. Afro-American it is the share of Afro-American individuals in 
the total population. Hispanic it is the share of individuals with Hispanic origin in the total population. 
Hispanic caucus it is a dummy coded as 1 if the representative is of Hispanic origin, 0 otherwise. Black 
caucus  it is a dummy coded as 1 if the representative of the district is of Afro-American origin, 0 
otherwise.    30 
Table 3: Empirical results for all constituencies and immigration bills 
The table reports marginal effects of probit regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered by state, are presented in parentheses. All specifications include year and state fixed 
effects as well as state*year interactions. ** Significant at 1%, * significant at 5%. See end of table 2 for a definition of the variables. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Dependent Variable: Vote on liberalization of unskilled immigration 
SkillRatio it  -0.306  1.351**  0.971**  1.251**  1.235**  1.212**  0.950**  0.811**  0.813**  0.978**  0.980** 
  (0.21)  (0.25)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.27)  (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.20) 
Unemployment it    10.29**  10.72**  9.587**  5.261**  5.032**  4.239*  3.903**  3.913*  4.257**  2.935 
    (2.04)  (1.37)  (1.74)  (1.54)  (1.85)  (1.81)  (1.37)  (1.56)  (1.52)  (1.63) 
Farm Worker it      -4.279**  -4.498**  -1.649**  -1.536**  0.237  0.156  0.153  -0.015  0.117 
      (0.77)  (0.71)  (0.60)  (0.58)  (1.00)  (0.86)  (0.86)  (0.95)  (0.83) 
ln (Family 
Income it) 
      -0.236  -0.134  -0.120*  -0.145*  -0.112*  -0.112**  -0.121*  -0.089* 
        (0.15)  (0.070)  (0.051)  (0.065)  (0.047)  (0.040)  (0.050)  (0.036) 
Democrat it          0.392**  0.340**  0.327**  0.322**  0.324**  0.372**  0.381** 
          (0.023)  (0.034)  (0.030)  (0.025)  (0.040)  (0.027)  (0.029) 
Share Democrat 
Votes it 
          0.153*  0.133  0.121  0.122  0.122  0.069 
            (0.072)  (0.079)  (0.076)  (0.071)  (0.085)  (0.075) 
Urban it              0.387**  0.231*  0.231*  0.237*  0.123 
              (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.13) 
Foreign-born it                1.025**  1.048**  1.004**  0.980** 
                (0.25)  (0.27)  (0.32)  (0.32) 
FB growth it                   -0.013  -0.012  -0.014 
                  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.013) 
Hispanic it                    0.143  0.302 
                    (0.16)  (0.17) 
Afro-American it                      0.347* 
                      (0.14) 
Observations  4441  4441  4441  4441  4441  4426  4426  4426  4426  4290  4290 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.207  0.298  0.324  0.328  0.442  0.442  0.451  0.464  0.464  0.461  0.463 
Log Likelihood  -2323  -2056  -1979  -1968  -1635  -1628  -1603  -1565  -1565  -1537  -1530   31 
Table 4: Robustness Checks: Economic channel 
The table reports marginal effects of probit regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered by state, are presented 
in parentheses. ** Significant at 1%, * significant at 5%. See end of table 2 for a definition of the variables. 
Notes (1) The Alternative SkillRatio it is the percentage of the population over 25 with less than 4 years of High 
School. (2) Manufacturing  it measures the share of individuals employed in manufacturing in the total labor 
force. (3) Constr/Ret it measures the share of people employed in wholesale & retail and construction in the total 
labor force.  
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent Variable: Vote on liberalization of unskilled immigration 
SkillRatio it    0.820**  1.120** 
    (0.20)  (0.23) 
 Alternative SkillRatio it  -1.096**     
  (0.30)     
Unemployment it  3.020  2.680  3.354 
  (1.70)  (1.63)  (1.79) 
Farm Worker it  0.509  -0.312  0.233 
  (0.82)  (0.84)  (0.81) 
Manufacturing it    -0.455*   
    (0.19)   
Constr/Ret it      0.649 
      (0.90) 
ln (Family Income it)  -0.0758*  -0.0750*  -0.0932* 
  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.036) 
Democrat it  0.378**  0.383**  0.390** 
  (0.028)  (0.025)  (0.026) 
Share Democrat Votes it  0.109  0.0643  0.0808 
  (0.082)  (0.076)  (0.072) 
Urban it  0.089  0.084  0.098 
  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.15) 
Foreign-born it  1.430**  1.037**  1.096** 
  (0.29)  (0.31)  (0.34) 
FB growth it   -0.008  -0.010  -0.007 
  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
Hispanic it  0.371  0.294*  0.260 
  (0.22)  (0.14)  (0.19) 
Afro-American it  0.451**  0.339*  0.318 
  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.17) 
Year Effects  yes  yes  yes 
State Effects  yes  yes  yes 
State * Year Interactions  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  4290  4290  3961 
Pseudo R-squared  0.463  0.464  0.459 
Log Likelihood  -1531  -1527  -1435   32 
Table 5: Robustness Checks: Political channel 
The table reports marginal effects of probit regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered by state, are presented 
in parentheses. ** Significant at 1%, * significant at 5%. See end of table 2 for a definition of the variables. 
Notes (1) DW Nominate it is an individual ideology score increasing in conservatism. (2) ADA it is a measure of 
how liberal a politician is computed by the Americans for Democratic Action. It ranges from 0 to 100, and a 
higher score indicates a more liberal politician. (3) Majority it a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
congressman belongs to the party controlling the House. (4) MajorityPres it takes a value of 1 if the congressman 
belongs to the party that controls the House and the one of the President. (5) PacLabor it and PacCorporate it are 
dummy variables that take the value 1 if the contributions from labor, respectively corporate, related Political 
Action  Committees  (PACs)  of  a  congressman  are  above  the  80th  percentile  of  all  Labor/Corporate  PAC 
contributions in year t.  
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Dependent Variable: Vote on liberalization of unskilled immigration 
SkillRatio it  0.788**  0.748**  0.857**  0.894**  1.351** 
  (0.21)  (0.19)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.36) 
Unemployment it  2.194  2.345  2.549  2.818  3.014* 
  (1.29)  (1.40)  (1.47)  (1.59)  (1.46) 
Farm Worker it  0.446  0.635  -0.0781  0.107  -1.010 
  (0.84)  (0.86)  (0.87)  (0.81)  (0.72) 
ln (Family Income it)  -0.100**  -0.0744*  -0.0544  -0.0767*  -0.141 
  (0.036)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.034)  (0.21) 
Democrat it      0.401**  0.408**  0.481** 
      (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.045) 
Share Democrat Votes it  0.00882  0.138*  0.0798  0.0601  0.103 
  (0.062)  (0.066)  (0.071)  (0.077)  (0.14) 
DW Nominate it  -0.636**         
  (0.049)         
ADA it    0.00633**       
    (0.00052)       
Majority it      -0.222**     
      (0.021)     
MajorityPres it        -0.234**   
        (0.014)   
PacLabor it          0.0494 
          (0.044) 
PacCorporate it          -0.0000588 
          (0.035) 
Urban it  0.129  0.0525  0.117  0.141  0.0585 
  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.15) 
Foreign-born it  0.853**  0.868**  0.871*  0.983**  1.026* 
  (0.28)  (0.30)  (0.36)  (0.34)  (0.42) 
FB growth it   -0.00918  -0.0163  -0.0137  -0.0134  -0.0123 
  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.018) 
Hispanic it  0.175  0.223  0.307*  0.257  0.544* 
  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.22) 
Afro-American it  0.119  0.169  0.291*  0.292*  0.620** 
  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.15) 
Year Effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
State Effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
State * Year Interactions  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  4290  4172  4290  4290  3464 
Pseudo R-squared  0.491  0.483  0.487  0.478  0.481 
Log Likelihood  -1450  -1434  -1462  -1487  -1224   33 
Table 6: Robustness Checks: Network channel 
 
 
The table reports marginal effects of probit regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered by state, are presented 
in parentheses. ** Significant at 1%, * significant at 5%. See end of table 2 for a definition of the variables. 
Notes (1) Hispanic Caucus it is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the politician belongs to the Hispanic caucus. 
(2) Black Caucus it is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the politician belongs to the Afro-American caucus.  
  (1)  (2) 
Dependent Variable: Vote on liberalization of unskilled immigration 
SkillRatio it  0.755**  0.964** 
  (0.19)  (0.21) 
Unemployment it  2.948*  2.402 
  (1.32)  (1.31) 
Farm Worker it  0.302  0.242 
  (0.72)  (0.78) 
ln (Family Income it)  -0.0918*  -0.0795* 
  (0.039)  (0.035) 
Democrat it  0.329**  0.393** 
  (0.024)  (0.026) 
Share Democrat Votes it  0.0773  0.0434 
  (0.065)  (0.082) 
Urban it  0.154  0.110 
  (0.11)  (0.11) 
Foreign-born it  1.142**  0.941** 
  (0.26)  (0.29) 
FB growth it   -0.0160  -0.0129 
  (0.012)  (0.014) 
Hispanic it    0.349* 
    (0.15) 
Afro-American it  0.260*   
  (0.13)   
Hispanic Caucus it  0.00904   
  (0.078)   
Black Caucus it    0.361** 
    (0.083) 
Year Effects  yes  yes 
State Effects  yes  yes 
State * Year Interactions  yes  yes 
Observations  4426  4290 
Pseudo R-squared  0.466  0.470 
Log Likelihood  -1560  -1510   34 
Table 7: Robustness checks: Geography & sample 
The table reports marginal effects of probit regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered by state, are presented 
in parentheses. ** Significant at 1%, * significant at 5%. In column (1) we include only voting records on major 
immigration legislations included (see table 1: H.R.3810, H.R.2202, H.R.4300, and H.R.4437). In column (2) we 
include  only  voting  records  of  representatives  from  South-Western  states  included  (Arizona,  California, 
Colorado, Kansas, Nevada,  New Mexico,  Oklahoma, Texas,  Utah). Finally, in column (3)  we include only 
voting records of representatives from High Immigration States (15 states with the highest share of foreign-born 
population)  included  (Arizona,  California,  Connecticut,  Florida,  Hawaii,  Illinois,  Oregon,  Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington).  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent Variable: Vote on liberalization of unskilled immigration 
SkillRatio it  1.124*  1.181**  0.969** 
  (0.56)  (0.23)  (0.26) 
Unemployment it  4.849*  -1.462  0.540 
  (1.94)  (1.93)  (1.78) 
Farm Worker it  2.275  0.185  0.263 
  (1.42)  (1.11)  (1.02) 
ln (Family Income it)  -0.214  -0.299**  -0.0545 
  (0.35)  (0.080)  (0.13) 
Democrat it  0.567**  0.428**  0.417** 
  (0.038)  (0.028)  (0.038) 
Share Democrat Votes it  0.00538  0.426**  0.223* 
  (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.11) 
Urban it  0.591*  0.123  -0.0856 
  (0.23)  (0.34)  (0.21) 
Foreign-born it  1.371*  0.665**  1.244** 
  (0.64)  (0.17)  (0.38) 
FB growth it   -0.0507*  -0.00296  -0.0263 
  (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.019) 
Hispanic it  -0.0773  0.662**  0.597** 
  (0.36)  (0.12)  (0.14) 
Afro-American it  -0.00698  0.0756  0.453* 
  (0.37)  (0.11)  (0.18) 
Year effects  yes  yes  yes 
State effects  yes  yes  yes 
State * Year Interactions  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  1422  1144  2322 
Pseudo R-squared  0.470  0.425  0.460 
Log Likelihood  -518.3  -453.4  -863.2   35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 